Endogenous ambiguity and rational miscommunication

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105686zbMATH Open1521.91044OpenAlexW4379880144MaRDI QIDQ6133346FDOQ6133346

Authors Toru Suzuki

Publication date 18 August 2023

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://philarchive.org/rec/SUZEAA-4

zbMATH Keywords

contextlanguagelinguistic ambiguitymessage costmiscommunication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Linguistics (91F20)

Recommendations

• Modes of ambiguous communication
• Endogenous ambiguity in cheap talk
• Maximal miscommunication
• Communication with endogenous information acquisition
• Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication

Cites work

• Efficient communication and indexicality
• Evolutionary stability in games of communication
• Failure of common knowledge of language in common-interest communication games
• Language and the theory of the firm
• Language barriers
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Voronoi languages: equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals

Cited in

(7)

• Toxic types and infectious communication breakdown
• Maximal miscommunication
• Modes of ambiguous communication
• Endogenous ambiguity in cheap talk
• Efficient communication and indexicality
• Strategic interpretations
• Fooling All of the People Some of the Time: A Theory of Endogenous Sequencing in Confidential Negotiations

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