Voronoi languages: equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals
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Publication:645660
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.03.008zbMath1274.91090OpenAlexW2269092122MaRDI QIDQ645660
Frank Riedel, Gerhard Jäger, Lars Peter Metzger
Publication date: 10 November 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.03.008
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