Strategic information transmission despite conflict
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Publication:2329418
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Cites work
- Advances in economics and econometrics. Tenth world congress. Volume 1: Economic theory. Proceedings of the 10th world congress of the Econometric Society, Shanghai, China, August 17--21, 2010
- Centroidal Voronoi Tessellations: Applications and Algorithms
- Comparative cheap talk
- Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
- Measures of symmetry for convex sets and stability
- Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
- On the Limits of Communication in Multidimensional Cheap Talk: A Comment
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Voronoi languages: equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals
Cited in
(18)- Dynamic cheap talk with static informational control
- Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission
- Comments on ``Strategic information transmission
- Strategic information transmission with sender's approval
- Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest
- Two-sided strategic information transmission
- Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: the single-crossing case
- Ethnic conflicts with informed agents: a cheap talk game with multiple audiences
- The strategic role of nonbinding communication
- Credulity, lies, and costly talk
- De-biasing strategic communication
- Strategic Information Revelation
- Dynamic strategic information transmission
- Strategic information transmission networks
- Cognitive empathy in conflict situations
- Signaling games in multiple dimensions: geometric properties of equilibrium solutions
- Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult
- Fomenting conflict
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