Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication
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Publication:2391973
DOI10.1007/s11238-012-9337-0zbMath1271.91080OpenAlexW2066648577MaRDI QIDQ2391973
Publication date: 6 August 2013
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23560/1/MPRA_paper_23560.pdf
Noncooperative games (91A10) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) General equilibrium theory (91B50)
Related Items (2)
Communication between unbiased agents ⋮ Costly and discrete communication: an experimental investigation
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