Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication

DOI10.1007/S11238-012-9337-0MaRDI QIDQ2391973zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 6 August 2013

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23560/1/MPRA_paper_23560.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkequilibrium selectioninformation transmissioncostly communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

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• A note on optimal cheap talk equilibria in a discrete state space
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3434 (Why is no real title available?)
• A note on cheap talk and burned money
• A simple model of secure public communication
• Cheap talk and burned money
• Communication and influence
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• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
• Evolutions of communication with partial common interest
• Language and the theory of the firm
• Language barriers
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Optimal Use of Communication Resources
• Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
• Pure communication between agents with close preferences.
• Refining cheap-talk equilibria
• Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic Transmission of Costly Information
• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
• Voronoi languages: equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals

Cited in

(12)

• The value of mediated communication
• Communication in Cournot oligopoly
• Toxic types and infectious communication breakdown
• Costly and discrete communication: an experimental investigation
• Repeated communication with private lying costs
• Modes of ambiguous communication
• A note on optimal cheap talk equilibria in a discrete state space
• Communication between unbiased agents
• Beneficial mediated communication in cheap talk
• Endogenous ambiguity and rational miscommunication
• Communication in the shadow of catastrophe
• Cheap talk with an exit option: the case of discrete action space

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