Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication

DOI10.1007/S11238-012-9337-0zbMATH Open1271.91080OpenAlexW2066648577MaRDI QIDQ2391973FDOQ2391973

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 6 August 2013

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23560/1/MPRA_paper_23560.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkequilibrium selectioninformation transmissioncostly communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Cites Work

• Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
• Strategic Information Transmission
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Optimal Use of Communication Resources
• Evolutions of communication with partial common interest
• Communication and influence
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
• Cheap talk and burned money
• Strategic Transmission of Costly Information
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
• Language barriers
• A note on cheap talk and burned money
• Refining cheap-talk equilibria
• Voronoi languages: equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals
• A simple model of secure public communication
• Language and the Theory of the Firm
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Pure communication between agents with close preferences.
• Costly and discrete communication: an experimental investigation

Cited In (4)

• Costly and discrete communication: an experimental investigation
• Repeated communication with private lying costs
• Communication between unbiased agents
• Endogenous ambiguity and rational miscommunication

   Recommendations

• A note on optimal cheap talk equilibria in a discrete state space 👍 👎
• Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives 👍 👎
• Modes of ambiguous communication 👍 👎
• Cheap talk with an exit option: the case of discrete action space 👍 👎
• Communication in Cournot oligopoly 👍 👎

This page was built for publication: Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2391973)