Strategic Transmission of Costly Information

DOI10.2307/2951741zbMath0866.90046OpenAlexW1975373707MaRDI QIDQ4302555

David Austen-Smith

Publication date: 20 July 1997

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951741

zbMATH Keywords

sender/receiver gameverifiability problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Applications of game theory (91A80) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (17)

Strategic gradual learning and information transmission ⋮ Costly information transmission in continuous time with implications for credit rating announcements ⋮ Dynamic learning and strategic communication ⋮ Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication ⋮ Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk ⋮ Information control in reputational cheap talk ⋮ Communication with endogenous information acquisition ⋮ Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games ⋮ Intentional vagueness ⋮ A signal-jamming model of persuasion: interest group funded policy research ⋮ Beneficial mediated communication in cheap talk ⋮ Communication is more than information sharing: the role of status-relevant knowledge ⋮ Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender ⋮ Agenda control as a cheap talk game: theory and experiments with storable votes ⋮ Informational control and organizational design ⋮ Who benefits from a sender's credibility concern, the sender or a receiver? ⋮ Compaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies

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