Costly information transmission in continuous time with implications for credit rating announcements
From MaRDI portal
Publication:310932
DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2012.03.003zbMath1345.91092MaRDI QIDQ310932
Publication date: 28 September 2016
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2012.03.003
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