Cheap talk and burned money

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2591zbMath1127.91366OpenAlexW1971587214MaRDI QIDQ1566900

David Austen-Smith, Jeffrey S. Banks

Publication date: 4 June 2000

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1245.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50) Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (20)

Costly information transmission in continuous time with implications for credit rating announcements ⋮ A model of interim information sharing under incomplete information ⋮ Goodwill in communication ⋮ On the benefits of party competition ⋮ Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication ⋮ Delegation and nonmonetary incentives ⋮ Optimal signaling with cheap talk and money burning ⋮ Sorting expertise ⋮ Multistage information transmission with voluntary monetary transfers ⋮ Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission ⋮ Optimal limited authority for principal ⋮ A note on cheap talk and burned money ⋮ Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence ⋮ Credible deviations from signaling equilibria ⋮ MONEY TALKS? AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF CHEAP TALK AND BURNED MONEY ⋮ Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: the regular case ⋮ Persuasion with communication costs ⋮ Cheap talk and burned money ⋮ Resisting persuasion ⋮ Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism

Cites Work

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• Stable equilibria and forward induction
• Interested experts and policy advice: Multiple referrals under open rule
• Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
• Cheap talk and burned money
• Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
• Strategic Information Transmission

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