MONEY TALKS? AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF CHEAP TALK AND BURNED MONEY

DOI10.1111/iere.12141zbMath1404.91035OpenAlexW2113262332MaRDI QIDQ5744894

Theo Offerman, Thomas de Haan, Randolph Sloof

Publication date: 10 February 2016

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www1.feb.uva.nl/creed/pdffiles/MoneyTalks21_11_2012.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

experimentcheap talkburning money

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items

Optimal signaling with cheap talk and money burning, Delegation based on cheap talk

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