Compaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2793zbMath1031.91107OpenAlexW3087895245MaRDI QIDQ1599832

Andrea Prat

Publication date: 27 February 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2793

zbMATH Keywords

electionscommon agencymodelcampaign financemultiple lobbypoliticianrational voter

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items

Campaign finance and welfare when contributions are spent on mobilizing voters ⋮ On the nature of equilibria in a Downsian model with candidate valence ⋮ The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections ⋮ Examining the impact of electoral competition and endogenous lobby formation on equilibrium policy platforms ⋮ Civic duty and political advertising ⋮ Extreme donors and policy convergence ⋮ Citizens or lobbies: who controls policy? ⋮ A dynamic analysis of special interest politics and electoral competition ⋮ MONEY TALKS? AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF CHEAP TALK AND BURNED MONEY ⋮ Introduction to political science

Cites Work

• On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
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• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic Transmission of Costly Information
• Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare
• Parties as Political Intermediaries
• Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
• Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule