On the benefits of party competition

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2008.10.007MaRDI QIDQ2389296zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dan Bernhardt, Larissa Campuzano, Francesco Squintani, Odilon Câmara

Publication date 15 July 2009

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.10.007

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• A model of political parties
• Cheap talk and burned money
• Optimal retention in agency problems
• Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems
• Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity

Cited in

(15)

• Parties as Political Intermediaries
• Two-party competition with persistent policies
• (Not) delegating decisions to experts: the effect of uncertainty
• Political payoffs and the electoral advantages of incumbency
• Introduction to the symposium in political economy
• Campaigning internally or externally
• Private agenda and re-election incentives
• Lobbying and policy extremism in repeated elections
• Term limits and bounds on policy responsiveness in dynamic elections
• A model of political parties
• Competition among parties and power: an empirical analysis
• The welfare implications of electoral polarization
• Competence and ideology
• Ideological extremism and primaries
• Learning about challengers

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