The welfare implications of electoral polarization

DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0874-7zbMATH Open1341.91017OpenAlexW3121379803MaRDI QIDQ904822FDOQ904822

Authors: Richard Van Weelden 

Publication date: 14 January 2016

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0874-7

Recommendations

• Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections
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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• On the benefits of party competition
• Candidates, credibility, and re-election incentives

Cited In (6)

• Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections
• Inequality, participation, and polarization
• Candidates, credibility, and re-election incentives
• Retrospective voting and party polarization
• Learning about challengers
• Party polarization in legislatures with office-motivated candidates

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