The welfare implications of electoral polarization

DOI10.1007/S00355-015-0874-7MaRDI QIDQ904822zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Richard Van Weelden

Publication date 14 January 2016

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0874-7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections
• On the benefits of party competition
• Private polling in elections and voter welfare
• Electoral competition under costly policy implementation
• Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting

Cites work

• Candidates, credibility, and re-election incentives
• On the benefits of party competition

Cited in

(6)

• Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections
• Inequality, participation, and polarization
• Candidates, credibility, and re-election incentives
• Retrospective voting and party polarization
• Learning about challengers
• Party polarization in legislatures with office-motivated candidates

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