On the influence of extreme parties in electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates

DOI10.1007/S00355-005-0019-5MaRDI QIDQ2500701zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors G. Casamatta, Philippe De Donder

Publication date 18 August 2006

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/1663/1/extreme_parties.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Electoral competition with strategic voters
• A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation
• Aggregate uncertainty in the citizen candidate model yields extremist parties
• Two-party competition with many constituencies
• Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates

Cites work

• A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation
• Candidate positioning and entry in a political competition
• Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values

Cited in

(12)

• Who emerges from smoke-filled rooms? Political parties and candidate selection
• Divergent platforms
• Extremism, campaigning and ambiguity
• Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems
• Competition among parties and power: an empirical analysis
• On the benefits of party competition
• A model of electoral competition with abstaining voters
• Ideological extremism and primaries
• Extreme parties and political rents
• Party polarization in legislatures with office-motivated candidates
• Aggregate uncertainty in the citizen candidate model yields extremist parties
• Does party polarization affect the electoral prospects of a new centrist candidate?

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