Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
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Publication:3685520
Recommendations
- Existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in a model of spatial electoral competition with entry
- Entry deterrence in electoral spatial competition
- Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates
- Weak equilibrium in a spatial election model
- Two candidate competition on differentiated policy sets
Cited in
(35)- Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
- Plurality rule works in three-candidate elections
- Vertical product differentiation and entry deterrence
- Entry deterrence in electoral spatial competition
- Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates
- Inequality, participation, and polarization
- Global and local players in a model of spatial competition
- Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules
- How good is a two-party election game?
- Does party polarization affect the electoral prospects of a new centrist candidate?
- Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives
- Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions
- Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment
- A Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with the option to quit
- The two-party system under alternative voting procedures
- On the influence of extreme parties in electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
- When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model
- Divergent platforms
- DYNAMIC ENTRY GAMES: THE CASE OF NATURAL DUOPOLY
- Political competition between differentiated candidates
- On Hierarchical Spatial Competition
- When parties are not teams: party positions in single-member district and proportional representation systems
- The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections
- Cycles in public opinion and the dynamics of stable party systems
- Retrospective voting and party polarization
- Existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in a model of spatial electoral competition with entry
- Aggregate uncertainty in the citizen candidate model yields extremist parties
- How does political uncertainty affect the optimal degree of policy divergence?
- Popularity in location games
- On the existence of a fixed-number equilibrium in a multiparty electoral system
- Two-party competition with many constituencies
- The Hotelling-Downs model with runoff voting
- Private polling in elections and voter welfare
- Stability in electoral competition: a case for multiple votes
- The binary policy model
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