Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
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Publication:3685520
DOI10.2307/2297710zbMath0568.90007OpenAlexW2042233114MaRDI QIDQ3685520
Publication date: 1984
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297710
Related Items (31)
Divergent platforms ⋮ DYNAMIC ENTRY GAMES: THE CASE OF NATURAL DUOPOLY ⋮ Private polling in elections and voter welfare ⋮ Inequality, participation, and polarization ⋮ Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment ⋮ Vertical product differentiation and entry deterrence ⋮ Political competition between differentiated candidates ⋮ Global and local players in a model of spatial competition ⋮ Aggregate uncertainty in the citizen candidate model yields extremist parties ⋮ When parties are not teams: party positions in single-member district and proportional representation systems ⋮ The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections ⋮ Stability in electoral competition: a case for multiple votes ⋮ A Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with the option to quit ⋮ The two-party system under alternative voting procedures ⋮ Cycles in public opinion and the dynamics of stable party systems ⋮ The binary policy model ⋮ Existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in a model of spatial electoral competition with entry ⋮ Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules ⋮ On the influence of extreme parties in electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates ⋮ When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model ⋮ How good is a two-party election game? ⋮ Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation? ⋮ On the existence of a fixed-number equilibrium in a multiparty electoral system ⋮ RETROSPECTIVE VOTING AND PARTY POLARIZATION ⋮ Two-party competition with many constituencies ⋮ The Hotelling-Downs model with runoff voting ⋮ Plurality rule works in three-candidate elections ⋮ Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates ⋮ Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives ⋮ Does party polarization affect the electoral prospects of a new centrist candidate? ⋮ Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions
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