Stability in electoral competition: a case for multiple votes
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Publication:899677
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.11.003zbMATH Open1371.91052OpenAlexW2193681675MaRDI QIDQ899677FDOQ899677
Publication date: 30 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://papers.econ.ucy.ac.cy/RePEc/papers/09-15.pdf
Cites Work
- A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem*
- Log-concave probability and its applications
- Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
- The Hotelling-Downs model with runoff voting
- Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
- One person, many votes: divided majority and information aggregation
- Approval voting with endogenous candidates
- Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem
- A theory of policy differentiation in single issue electoral politics
- Candidate positioning and entry in a political competition
- Mixed equilibria in runoff elections
- Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
- Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization
Cited In (9)
- Electoral competition under best-worst voting rules
- Vote splitting, reelection and electoral control: towards a unified model
- SEQUENTIAL OR SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS? A WELFARE ANALYSIS
- Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization
- Hotelling competition and the gamma distribution
- Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
- Does party polarization affect the electoral prospects of a new centrist candidate?
- Finding the majority-rule equilibrium under lexicographic comparison of candidates
- Hotelling-Downs equilibria: moving beyond plurality variants
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