Stability in electoral competition: a case for multiple votes
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Publication:899677
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.003zbMath1371.91052OpenAlexW2193681675MaRDI QIDQ899677
Publication date: 30 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://papers.econ.ucy.ac.cy/RePEc/papers/09-15.pdf
Related Items (5)
Electoral competition under best-worst voting rules ⋮ Hotelling-Downs equilibria: moving beyond plurality variants ⋮ Hotelling competition and the gamma distribution ⋮ Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization ⋮ Does party polarization affect the electoral prospects of a new centrist candidate?
Cites Work
- Mixed equilibria in runoff elections
- The Hotelling-Downs model with runoff voting
- Approval voting with endogenous candidates
- Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
- Candidate positioning and entry in a political competition
- A theory of policy differentiation in single issue electoral politics
- Log-concave probability and its applications
- One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation
- Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
- Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem
- Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
- A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem*
- Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization
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