Stability in electoral competition: a case for multiple votes
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Cites work
- A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem*
- A theory of policy differentiation in single issue electoral politics
- Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem
- Approval voting with endogenous candidates
- Candidate positioning and entry in a political competition
- Log-concave probability and its applications
- Mixed equilibria in runoff elections
- Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization
- One person, many votes: divided majority and information aggregation
- Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
- Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
- The Hotelling-Downs model with runoff voting
- Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
Cited in
(13)- A Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with the option to quit
- Vote splitting, reelection and electoral control: towards a unified model
- On the existence of a fixed-number equilibrium in a multiparty electoral system
- Finding the majority-rule equilibrium under lexicographic comparison of candidates
- Costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule
- Strategic party formation on a circle and Duverger's law
- Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
- Electoral competition under best-worst voting rules
- SEQUENTIAL OR SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS? A WELFARE ANALYSIS
- Hotelling competition and the gamma distribution
- Hotelling-Downs equilibria: moving beyond plurality variants
- Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization
- Does party polarization affect the electoral prospects of a new centrist candidate?
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