A theory of policy differentiation in single issue electoral politics

DOI10.1007/BF00183303MaRDI QIDQ1338544zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John E. Roemer

Publication date 1 December 1994

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00183303

zbMATH Keywords

electoral gameequilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cited in

(17)

• Policy choice as an electoral investment
• Political-economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case
• Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates
• Electoral competition under costly policy implementation
• The dynamics of issue introduction: A model based on the politics of ideology
• Parties with policy preferences and uncertainty over voter behavior
• Political motivations and electoral competition: equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence
• Political competition between differentiated candidates
• Political equilibria with electoral uncertainty
• Electoral competition with uncertainty averse parties
• Secondary issues and party politics: an application to environmental policy
• A theory of income taxation where politicians focus upon core and swing voters
• A Theory of Divided Government
• Aggregate uncertainty in the citizen candidate model yields extremist parties
• Responsive parties and political winner's curse
• Stability in electoral competition: a case for multiple votes
• The binary policy model

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