Political motivations and electoral competition: equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.004zbMath1291.91062MaRDI QIDQ2437169

Michalis Drouvelis, Nicolaas J. Vriend, Alejandro Saporiti

Publication date: 3 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.004

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibrium; power; ideology; electoral competition; experimental evidence; electoral uncertainty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A05: 2-person games

91B12: Voting theory

91A90: Experimental studies

Related Items

RETROSPECTIVE VOTING AND PARTY POLARIZATION, Unnamed Item, Policy polarization, primaries, and strategic voters, Location games with references, Electoral competition under costly policy implementation, Redistribution, power sharing and inequality concern, Power sharing and electoral equilibrium, Can paying politicians well reduce corruption? The effects of wages and uncertainty on electoral competition

Uses Software

• Gambit
• Z-Tree

Cites Work

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