Political motivations and electoral competition: equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.10.004MaRDI QIDQ2437169zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michalis Drouvelis, Alejandro Saporiti, Nicolaas J. Vriend

Publication date 3 March 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.004

zbMATH Keywords

powerNash equilibriumideologyelectoral competitionexperimental evidenceelectoral uncertainty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Experimental studies (91A90) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Multidimensional political competition with non-common beliefs
• Political competition between differentiated candidates
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• Vote-motivated candidates
• Nash equilibrium in multiparty competition with ``stochastic voters

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1907684 (Why is no real title available?)
• A theory of policy differentiation in single issue electoral politics
• Advances in the spatial theory of voting.
• David vs. Goliath: An Analysis of Asymmetric Mixed-Strategy Games and Experimental Evidence
• Discontinuity and non-existence of equilibrium in the probabilistic spatial voting model
• Elections with platform and valence competition
• Electoral Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information
• Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
• Experientia Docet: Professionals Play Minimax in Laboratory Experiments
• Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate
• Nonparametric tests of differences in medians: Comparison of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney and robust rank-order tests
• On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games
• On the nature of equilibria in a Downsian model with candidate valence
• Political Motivations
• Political-economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case
• Power sharing and electoral equilibrium
• Professionals Play Minimax
• The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation
• What happens in the field stays in the field: exploring whether professionals play minimax in laboratory experiments

Cited in

(17)

• Can paying politicians well reduce corruption? The effects of wages and uncertainty on electoral competition
• Location games with references
• Retrospective voting and party polarization
• Individual preferences and democratic processes: two theorems with implications for electoral politics
• Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates
• Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives
• Electoral competition under costly policy implementation
• Political Motivations
• Examining the impact of electoral competition and endogenous lobby formation on equilibrium policy platforms
• Redistribution, power sharing and inequality concern
• A model of political competition with activists applied to the elections of 1989 and 1995 in Argentina
• Power sharing and electoral equilibrium
• A theory of political gridlock
• Policy polarization, primaries, and strategic voters
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7733429 (Why is no real title available?)
• Performance of presidential candidates in a debate: a game theory perspective
• A theory of policy differentiation in single issue electoral politics

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Uses Software

• Gambit
• Z-Tree

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