Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1575091
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00040-2zbMath0952.91066MaRDI QIDQ1575091
Publication date: 25 September 2000
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment ⋮ Uncontested incumbents and incumbent upsets ⋮ Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules
Cites Work
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- Candidate positioning and entry in a political competition
- A theory of policy differentiation in single issue electoral politics
- Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
- On Hierarchical Spatial Competition
- An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
- A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates