Secondary issues and party politics: an application to environmental policy

DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0506-1MaRDI QIDQ537539zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vincent Anesi, Philippe De Donder

Publication date 20 May 2011

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/978/1/medias/doc/by/de_donder/environmental_taxation.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
• A model of political parties
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
• Coalitions, agreements and efficiency
• Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets
• Corruption, political competition and environmental policy
• Do people plan?
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• On the Measurement of Polarization
• The political economy of pollution taxes in a small open economy

Cited in

(4)

• The robustness of `enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend' alliances
• Environmental policy in majoritarian systems
• A coalitional theory of unemployment insurance and employment protection
• Political aspects of environmental policy

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