Secondary issues and party politics: an application to environmental policy
DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0506-1zbMATH Open1232.91595OpenAlexW2107543503MaRDI QIDQ537539FDOQ537539
Authors: Vincent Anesi, Philippe De Donder
Publication date: 20 May 2011
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/978/1/medias/doc/by/de_donder/environmental_taxation.pdf
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History, political science (91F10) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Voting theory (91B12)
Cites Work
- Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
- A model of political parties
- An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
- A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
- On the Measurement of Polarization
- Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
- Coalitions, agreements and efficiency
- Corruption, political competition and environmental policy
- Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets
- The political economy of pollution taxes in a small open economy
- Do people plan?
Cited In (4)
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