Strategic party formation on a circle and Duverger's law
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
- A general equilibrium model of multi-party competition
- A model of political parties
- An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
- Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems
- Strategic party formation on a circle and Duverger's law
Cited in
(6)- Structured preferences: a literature survey
- The two-party system under alternative voting procedures
- Multiple votes, ballot truncation and the two-party system: An experiment
- Equilibria on a circular market when consumers do not always buy from the closest firm
- Strategic party formation on a circle and Duverger's law
- Hotelling-Downs equilibria: moving beyond plurality variants
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