Strategic party formation on a circle and Duverger's law
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Publication:682489
DOI10.1007/S00355-016-0990-ZzbMATH Open1392.91039OpenAlexW2513521725WikidataQ59460070 ScholiaQ59460070MaRDI QIDQ682489FDOQ682489
Authors: Rene Saran, Ayşe Müge Yüksel, Ronald Peeters 
Publication date: 2 February 2018
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0990-z
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Cites Work
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- A model of political parties
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
- A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
- Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
- Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems
- A general equilibrium model of multi-party competition
- Strategic party formation on a circle and Duverger's law
Cited In (6)
- Strategic party formation on a circle and Duverger's law
- The two-party system under alternative voting procedures
- Multiple votes, ballot truncation and the two-party system: An experiment
- Equilibria on a circular market when consumers do not always buy from the closest firm
- Structured preferences: a literature survey
- Hotelling-Downs equilibria: moving beyond plurality variants
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