The Hotelling-Downs model with runoff voting

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.08.004MaRDI QIDQ765204zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sandro Brusco, Marcin Dziubiński, Jaideep Roy

Publication date 19 March 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.004

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumDowns modelfree entryrunoff system

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Recommendations

• A Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with the option to quit
• A general model for voting systems with multiple alternatives
• Majority runoff elections: strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis
• The difference model of voting
• Mixed equilibria in runoff elections
• The Linear Voting Model
• A dynamical model of electoral competition
• Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates
• Voter Model and Biased Voter Model in Heterogeneous Environments

Cites work

• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
• Candidate positioning and entry in a political competition
• Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
• Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule

Cited in

(9)

• Divergent platforms
• A Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with the option to quit
• Computing equilibrium in network utility-sharing and discrete election games
• Stability in electoral competition: a case for multiple votes
• Rationalizable behavior in the Hotelling-Downs model of spatial competition
• The Linear Voting Model
• Mixed equilibria in runoff elections
• Hotelling-Downs equilibria: moving beyond plurality variants
• Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules

This page was built for publication: The Hotelling-Downs model with runoff voting

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q765204)