The Hotelling-Downs model with runoff voting
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Publication:765204
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Cites work
Cited in
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- A Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with the option to quit
- Computing equilibrium in network utility-sharing and discrete election games
- Stability in electoral competition: a case for multiple votes
- Rationalizable behavior in the Hotelling-Downs model of spatial competition
- The Linear Voting Model
- Mixed equilibria in runoff elections
- Hotelling-Downs equilibria: moving beyond plurality variants
- Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules
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