Rationalizable behavior in the Hotelling-Downs model of spatial competition

DOI10.1007/s11238-022-09922-8zbMath1521.91262MaRDI QIDQ6176321

Joep van Sloun

Publication date: 22 August 2023

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

product differentiationspatial competitionrationalizabilityHotelling-Downs modelstatic games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Cites Work

• Rational beliefs in rationalizability
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• The Nature of Equilibrium in a Location Model
• The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium

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