The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition

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Publication:4047322

DOI10.2307/2296817zbMath0294.90003OpenAlexW2027538922MaRDI QIDQ4047322

Richard G. Lipsey, B. Curtis Eaton

Publication date: 1975

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/189072




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