The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition
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Publication:4047322
DOI10.2307/2296817zbMATH Open0294.90003OpenAlexW2027538922MaRDI QIDQ4047322FDOQ4047322
Authors: B. Curtis Eaton, Richard G. Lipsey 
Publication date: 1975
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/189072
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- A Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with the option to quit
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- Hotelling games with random tolerance intervals
- Are you being served? A general-equilibrium analysis of flexibility in production
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- Electoral competition under best-worst voting rules
- Central places: the theories of von Thünen, Christaller, and Lösch
- The follower competitive location problem with comparison-shopping
- Farsighted stable sets in Hotelling's location games
- Mathematical location and land use theory. An introduction.
- Location Games on Networks: Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria
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- Effects of multipurpose shopping trips on retail store location in a duopoly
- Geometric versions of finite games: Prisoner's dilemma, entry deterrence and a cyclical majority paradox
- Existence of vote maximizing equilibrium in one dimension
- Many-candidate Nash equilibria for elections involving random selection
- The equilibrium locations of three stores with different selections of differentiated products
- Structural properties of Voronoi diagrams in facility location problems with continuous demand
- Three-candidate competition when candidates have valence: The base case
- Spatial competition on 2-dimensional markets and networks when consumers don't always go to the closest firm
- Robust equilibria in location games
- Hotelling games in fault-prone settings
- Optimization of competitive facility location for chain stores
- An alternating heuristic for medianoid and centroid problems in the plane
- On competitive sequential location in a network with a decreasing demand intensity
- Multiunit facility location games
- Uneven spacing in free-entry equilibrium for spatial product differentiation
- The socially optimal locations of three stores with stockouts or limited product selections
- Hotelling competition and the gamma distribution
- Product differentiation in a vertical structure
- On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
- On agglomeration in competitive location models
- Equilibrium in simple spatial (or differentiated product) models
- A general equilibrium model of multi-party competition
- Mixed equilibrium in a pure location game: the case of \(n\geq 4\) firms
- Condorcet winners on median spaces
- Equilibria in Competitive Location Models
- Stability of equilibria in multi-party political systems
- Spatial price discrimination and the locations of firms with different product selections or product varieties
- General distribution of consumers in pure Hotelling games
- New perspectives in competitive location theory
- Symmetric equilibrium existence and optimality in differentiated product markets
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- When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model
- Equilibria in multi-party competition under uncertainty
- Location models as models of product choice
- Existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in a model of spatial electoral competition with entry
- Hotelling's location model with negative network externalities
- Equilibrium store locations when consumers minimize travel time plus waiting time
- On the performances of Nash equilibria in isolation games
- Equilibria on a circular market when consumers do not always buy from the closest firm
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- Single- and multi-objective defensive location problems on a network
- Multi-agent equilibria with market share and ranking objectives
- Stability of bifurcating patterns of spatial economy models on a hexagonal lattice
- Discrete Voronoi games and \(\epsilon\)-nets, in two and three dimensions
- Agglomeration as spatial interdependence between firms and households
- A bi-level programming model for protecting an important node in a network
- Downsian competition with four parties
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- Invariant patterns for replicator dynamics on a hexagonal lattice
- Global-local spatial platform for economic geography: mechanism for sustaining bifurcation
- Location games with references
- Competitive location models: a review
- Rationalizable behavior in the Hotelling-Downs model of spatial competition
- Group-theoretic spectrum analysis of population distribution in Southern Germany and Eastern USA
- Equilibria in non-cooperative competition of political parties having a common rate of morality
- Time evolution of city distributions in Germany. Group-theoretic spectrum analysis
- Technical note: The competitive facility location problem in a duopoly: advances beyond trees
- On the Performances of Nash Equilibria in Isolation Games
- Simulation of the Hotelling-Smithies game: Hotelling was not so wrong
- The 1-dimensional discrete Voronoi game
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- Spatial duopoly and residential structure
- Group-theoretic bifurcation mechanism of economic agglomerations on a square lattice
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