Geometric versions of finite games: Prisoner's dilemma, entry deterrence and a cyclical majority paradox

DOI10.1007/BF01240040MaRDI QIDQ1897342zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vicki Knoblauch

Publication date 27 August 1995

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01240040

zbMATH Keywords

cyclical majority paradoxentry deterrencegeometric versions of finite, two-person gameslocation gameprisoner's dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Recommendations

• On some problems in geometric game theory
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 934599
• The geometry of a stable game
• Geometry of `standoffs' in lattice models of the spatial prisoner's dilemma and snowdrift games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5077027
• A geometric approach to inference in set-identified entry games
• Game-dynamical aspects of the prisoner's dilemma
• Geometric analysis of a generalized Wythoff game
• On some variants of prisoner's dilemma dynamics

Cites work

• Non-existence of Equilibrium for the Two-dimensional Three-firms Location Problem
• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
• The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition

Cited in

(3)

• Continuous strategy games as location games
• A geometric approach to inference in set-identified entry games
• Finite neighborhood games with binary choices

This page was built for publication: Geometric versions of finite games: Prisoner's dilemma, entry deterrence and a cyclical majority paradox

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1897342)