Geometry of `standoffs' in lattice models of the spatial prisoner's dilemma and snowdrift games
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Publication:1673105
DOI10.1016/j.physa.2013.04.008zbMath1402.91048OpenAlexW2114515649MaRDI QIDQ1673105
Robert A. Laird, Dipankar Goyal, Soroosh Yazdani
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Physica A (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2013.04.008
Lattice systems (Ising, dimer, Potts, etc.) and systems on graphs arising in equilibrium statistical mechanics (82B20) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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Cites Work
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- MORE SPATIAL GAMES
- THE SPATIAL DILEMMAS OF EVOLUTION
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- EVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY DYNAMICS FOR TAG-BASED COOPERATION AND DEFECTION IN THE SPATIAL AND ASPATIAL SNOWDRIFT GAME
- The Calculus of Selfishness
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