General distribution of consumers in pure Hotelling games

DOI10.1007/S00182-018-0648-4MaRDI QIDQ2424232zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Gaëtan Fournier

Publication date 24 June 2019

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1602.04851

zbMATH Keywords

approximate Nash equilibrialarge gamespure equilibriaHotelling gameslocation games on networks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Games involving graphs (91A43) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Abstract: A pure Hotelling game is a competition between a finite number of players who select simultaneously a location in order to attract as many consumers as possible. In this paper, we study the case of a general distribution of consumers on a network generated by a metric graph. Because players do not compete on price, the continuum of consumers shop at the closest player's location. Under regularity hypothesis on the distribution we prove the existence of an epsilon-equilibrium in pure strategies and we construct it, provided that the number of players is larger than a lower bound.

Recommendations

• On Hotelling's competition with non-uniform customer distributions
• The continuous Hotelling pure location game with elastic demand revisited
• Location Games on Networks: Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria
• Equilibrium in Hotelling's Model of Spatial Competition
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Cites work

• Competition of Firms: Discriminatory Pricing and Location
• Hotelling's location model with negative network externalities
• Large spatial competition
• Location Games on Networks: Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria
• Location, location, location
• On Hotelling's competition with non-uniform customer distributions
• The Nature of Equilibrium in a Location Model
• The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition

Cited in

(11)

• Local market structure in a Hotelling town
• Hotelling games with random tolerance intervals
• Equilibria in unidirectional spatial models
• Location games with references
• Large spatial competition
• Nash equilibrium structure of Cox process Hotelling games
• Spatial competition on 2-dimensional markets and networks when consumers don't always go to the closest firm
• The continuous Hotelling pure location game with elastic demand revisited
• On the existence and social optimality of equilibria in a Hotelling game with uncertain demand and linear-quadratic costs
• Hotelling competition and the gamma distribution
• Discrete hotelling pure location games: potentials and equilibria

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