Nash equilibrium structure of Cox process Hotelling games

DOI10.1017/APR.2021.45MaRDI QIDQ5084795zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Venkat Anantharam, Francois Baccelli

Publication date 28 June 2022

Published in Advances in Applied Probability (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2008.06617

zbMATH Keywords

constant-sum gameCox processgame theoryHotelling competitionNash equilibriumPoisson process

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Point processes (e.g., Poisson, Cox, Hawkes processes) (60G55) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Abstract: We study an N-player game where a pure action of each player is to select a non-negative function on a Polish space supporting a finite diffuse measure, subject to a finite constraint on the integral of the function. This function is used to define the intensity of a Poisson point process on the Polish space. The processes are independent over the players, and the value to a player is the measure of the union of its open Voronoi cells in the superposition point process. Under randomized strategies, the process of points of a player is thus a Cox process, and the nature of competition between the players is akin to that in Hotelling competition games. We characterize when such a game admits Nash equilibria and prove that when a Nash equilibrium exists, it is unique and comprised of pure strategies that are proportional in the same proportions as the total intensities. We give examples of such games where Nash equilibria do not exist. A better understanding of the criterion for the existence of Nash equilibria remains an intriguing open problem.

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Cited in

(2)

• Hotelling games in fault-prone settings
• On the existence and social optimality of equilibria in a Hotelling game with uncertain demand and linear-quadratic costs

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