Robust equilibria in location games
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Cites work
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Cited in
(7)- Retail location competition under carbon penalty
- Two-player location game in a closed-loop market with quantity competition
- Two-player simultaneous location game: preferential rights and overbidding
- A pure strategy nash equilibrium for a 3-firm location game on a sphere
- Stability of Nash equilibria in locational games
- Location Games on Networks: Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria
- Location games with references
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