Location games with references

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.07.012MaRDI QIDQ6148358zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gaëtan Fournier, Amaury Francou

Publication date 11 January 2024

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2207.14044

zbMATH Keywords

costly product differentiationlocation gamesspatial competitionspatial voting theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Abstract: We study a class of location games where players want to attract as many resources as possible and pay a cost when deviating from an exogenous reference location. This class of games includes political competitions between policy-interested parties and firms' costly horizontal differentiation. We provide a complete analysis of the duopoly competition: depending on the reference locations, we observe a unique equilibrium with, or without differentiation, or no equilibrium. We extend the analysis to a competition between an arbitrary number of players and we show that there exists at most one equilibrium which has a strong property: only the two most-left and most-right players deviate from their reference locations.

Recommendations

• A noncooperative analysis of Hotelling's location game
• Robust equilibria in location games
• Multiunit facility location games
• The continuous Hotelling pure location game with elastic demand revisited
• Discrete hotelling pure location games: potentials and equilibria

Cites work

• Competition in multi-characteristics spaces: Hotelling was almost right
• Elections with platform and valence competition
• General distribution of consumers in pure Hotelling games
• Minimal and maximal product differentiation in Hotelling's duopoly
• On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
• Optimal Fiscal Regime in a Spatial Duopoly
• Political Motivations
• Political motivations and electoral competition: equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence
• Special majority rules and the existence of voting equilibria
• The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition

Cited in

(2)

• Ideological consistency and valence
• Popularity in location games

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