Optimal Fiscal Regime in a Spatial Duopoly

DOI10.1006/JUEC.1996.2007MaRDI QIDQ4214720zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Luca Lambertini

Publication date 8 April 1999

Published in Journal of Urban Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://amsacta.unibo.it/5121/1/205.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

horizontally differentiated duopolypublic authoritysocially optimal locations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Spatial models in sociology (91D25)

Recommendations

• Optimal fiscal policies in an economy with externalities from public spending
• Optimal fiscal policy with heterogeneous agents
• Optimal taxation in a common resource oligopoly game
• Spatial duopoly with cost subsidy
• Optimal income taxation under monopolistic competition
• Coordination of optimal taxation in a two-country equilibrium model
• Optimal fiscal policy in the Uzawa-Lucas model with externalities
• Mixed spatial duopoly, consumers' distribution and efficiency

Cited in

(8)

• Spatial duopoly with cost subsidy
• A Hotelling model with production
• A public firm in a model of spatial duopoly with price discrimination
• An auction theoretical approach to fiscal wars
• Centralized or decentralized bargaining in a vertically-related market with endogenous price/quantity choices
• Location games with references
• Validity of the ``principle of maximum product differentiation in a unionized mixed-duopoly
• Tax effects in a model of product differentiation: A note

This page was built for publication: Optimal Fiscal Regime in a Spatial Duopoly

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4214720)