Farsighted stable sets in Hotelling's location games
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Publication:419407
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3084669 (Why is no real title available?)
- An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
- Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- Farsighted stability in an \(n\)-person prisoner's dilemma
- Farsighted stability in average return games
- Farsighted stability in provision of perfectly ``lumpy public goods
- Noncooperative farsighted stable set in an \(n\)-player prisoners' dilemma
- Spatial Competition with a Land Market: Hotelling and Von Thunen Unified
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, II: Applications
- The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition
- The theory of social situations. A game-theoretic approach.
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- Catalog competition and stable nonlinear prices
- Maximin, minimax, and von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable sets
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