Farsighted stability in average return games

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00013-6MaRDI QIDQ1867843zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Takeshi Masuda

Publication date 2 April 2003

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(02)00013-6

zbMATH Keywords

Average return gameFarsighted stable setIndividual rationalitylargest consistent setPareto efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Review text

che author considers a production economy with a commonly owned production process. In an average return game for such an economy, each agent chooses his input contribution and the total output is distributed proportional to the individual input contributions. He examines two notions of stability on strategy profiles in an average return game: A farsighted stable set and the largest consistent set. It is shown that every farsighted stable set is essentially a singleton and it is contained in the set of Pareto efficient strategy profiles. By contrast the largest consistent set is so large as to contain also Pareto inefficient strategy profiles, i.e., it is equal to the set of individually rational strategy profiles.

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Cites work

• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
• Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3084669 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the uniqueness of equilibrium in Cournot oligopoly and other games
• The theory of social situations. A game-theoretic approach.

Cited in

(7)

• Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games
• Farsighted stability in provision of perfectly ``lumpy public goods
• Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies
• Maximin, minimax, and von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable sets
• Farsighted stable sets in Hotelling's location games
• Cooperative games (von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets)
• Farsightedly stable tariffs

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