When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model
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Publication:2500749
DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0082-6zbMATH Open1132.91396OpenAlexW2166075674MaRDI QIDQ2500749FDOQ2500749
Authors: Richard Chisik, Robert J. Lemke 
Publication date: 18 August 2006
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://economics.ryerson.ca/workingpapers/wp021.pdf
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Cites Work
- Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
- Advances in the spatial theory of voting.
- The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition
- Candidate positioning and entry in a political competition
- When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model
- Multi-agent equilibria with market share and ranking objectives
Cited In (8)
- Electoral competition under best-worst voting rules
- Pure strategy Nash equilibria for bargaining models of collective choice
- Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections
- Three-candidate competition when candidates have valence: The base case
- Discontinuity and non-existence of equilibrium in the probabilistic spatial voting model
- On existence of pure strategy equilibrium with endogenous income
- When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model
- Hotelling-Downs equilibria: moving beyond plurality variants
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