When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model
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Publication:2500749
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Cites work
- Advances in the spatial theory of voting.
- Candidate positioning and entry in a political competition
- Multi-agent equilibria with market share and ranking objectives
- Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
- The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition
- When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model
Cited in
(8)- On existence of pure strategy equilibrium with endogenous income
- Pure strategy Nash equilibria for bargaining models of collective choice
- When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model
- Electoral competition under best-worst voting rules
- Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections
- Discontinuity and non-existence of equilibrium in the probabilistic spatial voting model
- Three-candidate competition when candidates have valence: The base case
- Hotelling-Downs equilibria: moving beyond plurality variants
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