Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates

DOI10.1007/3-540-27295-X_2zbMATH Open1255.91012MaRDI QIDQ5486922FDOQ5486922

John Duggan, Jeffrey S. Banks

Publication date: 18 September 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Strategic Decisions (Search for Journal in Brave)

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Voting theory (91B12)

Cited In (36)

• Political equilibria with electoral uncertainty
• Competition for popular support: a valence model of elections in Turkey
• Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives
• Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models
• Policy convergence in a two-candidate probabilistic voting model
• Multidimensional electoral competition between differentiated candidates
• Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists
• Unidimensional Downsian politics: median, utilitarian or what else?
• Political competition between differentiated candidates
• Electoral competition with uncertainty averse parties
• Gridlock or Leadership in U.S. Electoral Politics
• Elections and strategic positioning games
• Vote-motivated candidates
• Generic difference of expected vote share and probability of victory maximization in simple plurality elections with probabilistic voters
• Discontinuity and non-existence of equilibrium in the probabilistic spatial voting model
• Pareto optimality in spatial voting models
• Advances in the spatial theory of voting.
• Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model
• The equivalence between costly and probabilistic voting models
• Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules
• Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
• Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates
• Optimal location of candidates in ideological space
• ELECTORAL MALDISTRICTING
• A model of electoral competition with abstaining voters
• Equilibrium existence for zero-sum games and spatial models of elections
• Ideological extremism and primaries
• A theory of voting in large elections
• The probability of an undominated central voter in 2-dimensional spatial majority voting
• When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Davis-Hinich conditions and median outcomes in probabilistic voting models
• Candidate behavior under mixed motives
• The spatial model with non-policy factors: a theory of policy-motivated candidates
• Probabilistic voting and platform selection in multi-party elections
• Finding the majority-rule equilibrium under lexicographic comparison of candidates

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