Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-motivated Candidates
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Publication:5486922
DOI10.1007/3-540-27295-X_2zbMATH Open1255.91012MaRDI QIDQ5486922FDOQ5486922
Authors: Jeffrey S. Banks, John Duggan 
Publication date: 18 September 2006
Published in: Social Choice and Strategic Decisions (Search for Journal in Brave)
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- Political competition between differentiated candidates
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- Gridlock or Leadership in U.S. Electoral Politics
- Elections and strategic positioning games
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- Generic difference of expected vote share and probability of victory maximization in simple plurality elections with probabilistic voters
- Discontinuity and non-existence of equilibrium in the probabilistic spatial voting model
- Pareto optimality in spatial voting models
- Advances in the spatial theory of voting.
- Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model
- The equivalence between costly and probabilistic voting models
- Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules
- Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
- Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates
- Optimal location of candidates in ideological space
- ELECTORAL MALDISTRICTING
- A model of electoral competition with abstaining voters
- Equilibrium existence for zero-sum games and spatial models of elections
- Ideological extremism and primaries
- A theory of voting in large elections
- The probability of an undominated central voter in 2-dimensional spatial majority voting
- When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Davis-Hinich conditions and median outcomes in probabilistic voting models
- Spatial electoral competition with a probabilistically favored candidate
- Candidate behavior under mixed motives
- The spatial model with non-policy factors: a theory of policy-motivated candidates
- Probabilistic voting and platform selection in multi-party elections
- Finding the majority-rule equilibrium under lexicographic comparison of candidates
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