Optimal location of candidates in ideological space

DOI10.1007/BF01254297MaRDI QIDQ1124541zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Guillermo Owen, Lloyd S. Shapley

Publication date 1989

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01254297

zbMATH Keywords

spatial voting gamepower indexstrong pointcenter of powerShapley's modified valuetwo-party election

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

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Cited in

(31)

• Spatial games and endogenous coalition formation
• Extremal Restriction, Condorcet Sets, and Majority Decision Making
• Electoral competition in 2-dimensional ideology space with unidimensional commitment
• On the Coleman indices of voting power
• On the dimension of the set of yolk centers
• Effectivity and power
• A polynomial-time algorithm for computing the yolk in fixed dimension
• An axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index
• Monotonicity of power and power measures
• A note on voting
• The Banzhaf index in representative systems with multiple political parties
• Power in the Council of the EU: organizing theory, a new index, and Brexit
• An issue based power index
• Power indices in the context of social learning behaviour in social networks
• On the uniqueness of the yolk
• In quest of the Banks set in spatial voting games
• A finite exact algorithm for epsilon-core membership in two dimensions
• The Owen and Shapley spatial power indices: a comparison and a generalization
• The almost surely shrinking yolk
• Preferences, the agenda setter, and the distribution of power in the EU
• Who has the power in the EU?
• Spatial power indices with applications on real voting data from the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech parliament
• Finessing a point: augmenting the core
• Spectrum value for coalitional games
• Probabilistic Owen-Shapley spatial power indices
• Stable outcomes in spatial voting games
• The Shapley value on convex geometries
• On authority distributions in organizations: Equilibrium.
• Probabilistic spatial power indexes
• A theorem connecting Shapley-Owen power scores and the radius of the yolk in two dimensions
• A note on the finesse point

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