Optimal location of candidates in ideological space
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DOI10.1007/BF01254297zbMATH Open0678.90103OpenAlexW2068895800MaRDI QIDQ1124541FDOQ1124541
Authors: Guillermo Owen, Lloyd S. Shapley 
Publication date: 1989
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01254297
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- Spatial power indices with applications on real voting data from the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech parliament
- On authority distributions in organizations: Equilibrium.
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- Power indices in the context of social learning behaviour in social networks
- Preferences, the agenda setter, and the distribution of power in the EU
- Finessing a point: augmenting the core
- Probabilistic Owen-Shapley spatial power indices
- On the Coleman indices of voting power
- An axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index
- The Shapley value on convex geometries
- Probabilistic spatial power indexes
- Spatial games and endogenous coalition formation
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