Recommendations
Cites work
- A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule
- A finite exact algorithm for epsilon-core membership in two dimensions
- A polynomial-time algorithm for computing the yolk in fixed dimension
- Generic Instability of Majority Rule
- Limiting distributions for continuous state Markov voting models
- Limiting median lines do not suffice to determine the yolk
- Optimal location of candidates in ideological space
- Stable outcomes in spatial voting games
- The instability of instability of centered distributions
- The probability of majority rule instability in the 2D Euclidean model with an even number of voters
- The uncovered set in spatial voting games
Cited in
(7)- Generalized medians and a political center
- Approximation of the yolk by the LP yolk
- Dominance in spatial voting with imprecise ideals
- Limiting median lines frequently determine the yolk. A rejoinder
- The almost surely shrinking yolk
- Limiting median lines do not suffice to determine the yolk
- Two candidate competition on differentiated policy sets
This page was built for publication: On the uniqueness of the yolk
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