The uncovered set in spatial voting games

DOI10.1007/BF00126302MaRDI QIDQ1098794zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Scott L. Feld, Bernard Grofman, Richard Hartly, Nicholas Noviello, Marc D. Kilgour, Nicholas R. Miller

Publication date 1987

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00126302

zbMATH Keywords

uncovered setBanks setspatial voting gamesmajority rule voting gameSchattschneider set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• Stable outcomes in spatial voting games
• The geometry of the uncovered set in the three-voter spatial model
• Recognizing majority-rule equilibrium in spatial voting games
• On β-Plurality Points in Spatial Voting Games.
• On β-Plurality Points in Spatial Voting Games
• Limits on agenda control in spatial voting games
• Spatial voting games, relation algebra and RelView
• Equilibrium existence for zero-sum games and spatial models of elections
• On the core of voting games
• The spatial ultimatum game revisited

Cites work

• A Stochastic Solution Concept for n-Person Games
• A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
• General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
• Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• Limiting distributions for continuous state Markov voting models
• Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule
• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• The geometry of the uncovered set in the three-voter spatial model

Cited in

(17)

• Generalized medians and a political center
• The geometry of the uncovered set in the three-voter spatial model
• Voting in one's head as a source of nearly transitive individual preferences over multi-dimensional issues
• A polynomial-time algorithm for computing the yolk in fixed dimension
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1405563 (Why is no real title available?)
• Spatial voting games, relation algebra and RelView
• On the uniqueness of the yolk
• In quest of the Banks set in spatial voting games
• The Banks set in infinite spaces
• The almost surely shrinking yolk
• The probability of an undominated central voter in 2-dimensional spatial majority voting
• Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model
• Formal versus informal legislative bargaining
• A theorem connecting Shapley-Owen power scores and the radius of the yolk in two dimensions
• The size of the yolk: Computations for odd and even-numbered committees
• The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems
• Weak covering relations

This page was built for publication: The uncovered set in spatial voting games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1098794)