The uncovered set in spatial voting games

DOI10.1007/BF00126302MaRDI QIDQ1098794zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Scott L. Feld, Bernard Grofman, Richard Hartly, Nicholas Noviello, Marc D. Kilgour, Nicholas R. Miller

Publication date 1987

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00126302

zbMATH Keywords

Banks setmajority rule voting gameSchattschneider setspatial voting gamesuncovered set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Review text

In a majority rule voting game, the uncovered set is the set of alternatives each of which can defeat every other alternative in the space either directly or indirectly at one remove. Research has suggested that outcomes under most reasonable agenda processes (both sincere and sophisticated) will be confined to the uncovered set. Most research on the uncovered set has been done in the context of voting games with a finite number of alternatives and relatively little is known about the properties of the uncovered set in spatial voting games. We examine the geometry of the uncovered set in spatial voting games and the geometry of two important subsets of the uncovered set, the Banks set and the Schattschneider set. In particular, we find both general upper and lower limits on the size of the uncovered set, and we give the exact bounds of the uncovered set for situations with three voters. For situations with three voters, we show that the Banks set is identical to the uncovered set.

Recommendations

• Stable outcomes in spatial voting games
• The geometry of the uncovered set in the three-voter spatial model
• Recognizing majority-rule equilibrium in spatial voting games
• On β-Plurality Points in Spatial Voting Games.
• On β-Plurality Points in Spatial Voting Games
• Limits on agenda control in spatial voting games
• Spatial voting games, relation algebra and RelView
• Equilibrium existence for zero-sum games and spatial models of elections
• On the core of voting games
• The spatial ultimatum game revisited

Cites work

• A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
• A Stochastic Solution Concept for n-Person Games
• General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
• Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• Limiting distributions for continuous state Markov voting models
• Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule
• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• The geometry of the uncovered set in the three-voter spatial model

Cited in

(17)

• The geometry of the uncovered set in the three-voter spatial model
• The probability of an undominated central voter in 2-dimensional spatial majority voting
• Weak covering relations
• Generalized medians and a political center
• The almost surely shrinking yolk
• In quest of the Banks set in spatial voting games
• Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model
• Formal versus informal legislative bargaining
• Spatial voting games, relation algebra and RelView
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1405563 (Why is no real title available?)
• The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems
• On the uniqueness of the yolk
• A polynomial-time algorithm for computing the yolk in fixed dimension
• The size of the yolk: Computations for odd and even-numbered committees
• A theorem connecting Shapley-Owen power scores and the radius of the yolk in two dimensions
• The Banks set in infinite spaces
• Voting in one's head as a source of nearly transitive individual preferences over multi-dimensional issues

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