Spatial voting games, relation algebra and RelView
DOI10.1016/J.JLAP.2014.02.003zbMATH Open1434.91031OpenAlexW1972486778WikidataQ114851537 ScholiaQ114851537MaRDI QIDQ406437FDOQ406437
Rudolf Berghammer, Harrie de Swart, Agnieszka Rusinowska
Publication date: 8 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Logical and Algebraic Methods in Programming (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlap.2014.02.003
Pareto setuncovered setrelation algebrabeating relationcovering relationmajority corespatial voting game
Symbolic computation and algebraic computation (68W30) Games involving graphs (91A43) Voting theory (91B12) Cylindric and polyadic algebras; relation algebras (03G15)
Cites Work
- Theory and Applications of Relational Structures as Knowledge Instruments
- Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
- Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
- General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
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- Applying relation algebra and RelView to measures in a social network
- Computing tournament solutions using relation algebra and RelView
- Applying relational algebra and REL VIEW to coalition formation
- The geometry of the uncovered set in the three-voter spatial model
- An interdisciplinary approach to coalition formation
- Social Networks: Prestige, Centrality, and Influence
- Computations on Simple Games Using RelView
- Computational Social Choice Using Relation Algebra and RelView
- Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point
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- Social Software for Coalition Formation
Cited In (3)
Uses Software
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