The geometry of the uncovered set in the three-voter spatial model

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(87)90020-5zbMATH Open0637.90005OpenAlexW1989159573MaRDI QIDQ1098733FDOQ1098733

Authors: D. Marc Kilgour, Richard I. Hartley 

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(87)90020-5

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zbMATH Keywords

majority ruleuncovered setspatial modelcovering relation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The uncovered set in spatial voting games
• Advances in the spatial theory of voting.

Cited In (7)

• Spatial voting games, relation algebra and RelView
• In quest of the Banks set in spatial voting games
• The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems
• The uncovered set in spatial voting games
• The existence of a majority rule maximal set in arbitrary \(n\)-dimensional spatial models
• Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model
• A critique of distributional analysis in the spatial model

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