The geometry of the uncovered set in the three-voter spatial model

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(87)90020-5MaRDI QIDQ1098733zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors D. Marc Kilgour, Richard I. Hartley

Publication date 1987

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(87)90020-5

zbMATH Keywords

majority ruleuncovered setspatial modelcovering relation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
• Advances in the spatial theory of voting.
• The uncovered set in spatial voting games

Cited in

(7)

• A critique of distributional analysis in the spatial model
• Spatial voting games, relation algebra and RelView
• In quest of the Banks set in spatial voting games
• The uncovered set in spatial voting games
• Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model
• The existence of a majority rule maximal set in arbitrary \(n\)-dimensional spatial models
• The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems

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