Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2004.08.001MaRDI QIDQ2490129zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jeffrey S. Banks, John Duggan, Michel Le Breton

Publication date 28 April 2006

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.08.001

zbMATH Keywords

CoreElectionsContinuum of votersSpatial modelUncovered setUndominated set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Spatial models in sociology (91D25) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cited in

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1405563 (Why is no real title available?)
• Coalitions and catastrophic climate change
• The probability of majority rule instability in the 2D Euclidean model with an even number of voters
• Uncovered bargaining solutions
• Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction
• Competition for popular support: a valence model of elections in Turkey
• Uncovered sets
• A unified view of the existence of maximals
• Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists
• Multidimensional electoral competition between differentiated candidates
• Jeffrey Scot Banks (1958--2000)
• The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems
• The geometry of the uncovered set in the three-voter spatial model
• Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections
• The almost surely shrinking yolk
• Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games
• Advances in the spatial theory of voting.
• A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games
• Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
• Purification of Bayes Nash equilibrium with correlated types and interdependent payoffs
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• Toward a \(50\%\)-majority equilibrium when voters are symmetrically distributed
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• A critique of distributional analysis in the spatial model
• Approximation of the yolk by the LP yolk
• The instability of instability of centered distributions
• Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives
• Dominance in spatial voting with imprecise ideals
• Limiting dictatorial rules
• A systematic approach to the construction of non-empty choice sets

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