Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2004.08.001MaRDI QIDQ2490129zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jeffrey S. Banks, John Duggan, Michel Le Breton

Publication date 28 April 2006

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.08.001

zbMATH Keywords

Continuum of votersCoreElectionsSpatial modelUncovered setUndominated set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14) Spatial models in sociology (91D25)

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Cites work

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Cited in

(31)

• The geometry of the uncovered set in the three-voter spatial model
• Jeffrey Scot Banks (1958--2000)
• Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections
• Toward a 50\%-majority equilibrium when voters are symmetrically distributed
• Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games
• Dominance in spatial voting with imprecise ideals
• The instability of instability of centered distributions
• The almost surely shrinking yolk
• A critique of distributional analysis in the spatial model
• Approximation of the yolk by the LP yolk
• Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives
• Multidimensional electoral competition between differentiated candidates
• A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games
• Uncovered sets
• Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
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• Competition for popular support: a valence model of elections in Turkey
• The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems
• Secure and perfect maximality
• The probability of majority rule instability in the 2D Euclidean model with an even number of voters
• Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists
• Purification of Bayes Nash equilibrium with correlated types and interdependent payoffs

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