Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2004.08.001zbMATH Open1108.91023OpenAlexW2129773382MaRDI QIDQ2490129FDOQ2490129

Authors: Jeffrey S. Banks, John Duggan, Michel Le Breton 

Publication date: 28 April 2006

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.08.001

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zbMATH Keywords

CoreElectionsContinuum of votersSpatial modelUncovered setUndominated set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Spatial models in sociology (91D25) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the core of voting games
• The uncovered set in spatial voting games
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• The generic existence of a core for \(q\)-rules
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
• Continuity Properties of Paretian Utility
• The bipartisan set of a tournament game
• Tournament solutions and majority voting
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the Continuous Representation of Preorders
• The geometry of the uncovered set in the three-voter spatial model
• Choosing from a tournament
• May's theorem with an infinite population
• Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments
• Conditions for Voting Equilibria in Continuous Voter Distributions
• Gillies and Miller's Subrelations of a Relation over an Infinite Set of Alternatives: General Results and Applications to Voting Games
• On 64%-Majority Rule
• Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections
• Comparison functions and choice correspondences
• Mixed refinements of Shapley's saddles and weak tournaments
• Generic Instability of Majority Rule
• Arrow's theorem with restricted coalition algebras
• A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule
• Optimal Strategies for a Generalized "Scissors, Paper, and Stone" Game
• The almost surely shrinking yolk
• The size of the yolk: Computations for odd and even-numbered committees
• Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model
• Sophisticated voting over multidimensional choice spaces†
• Non-collegial simple games and the nowhere denseness of the set of preference profiles having a core
• Anonymity in large societies

Cited In (30)

• The probability of majority rule instability in the 2D Euclidean model with an even number of voters
• Uncovered bargaining solutions
• Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction
• Competition for popular support: a valence model of elections in Turkey
• Uncovered sets
• A unified view of the existence of maximals
• Multidimensional electoral competition between differentiated candidates
• Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists
• Jeffrey Scot Banks (1958--2000)
• The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems
• The geometry of the uncovered set in the three-voter spatial model
• Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections
• The almost surely shrinking yolk
• Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games
• Advances in the spatial theory of voting.
• A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games
• Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
• Purification of Bayes Nash equilibrium with correlated types and interdependent payoffs
• The Structure of the Spatial Theory of Elections
• Toward a \(50\%\)-majority equilibrium when voters are symmetrically distributed
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A critique of distributional analysis in the spatial model
• Approximation of the yolk by the LP yolk
• The instability of instability of centered distributions
• Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives
• Dominance in spatial voting with imprecise ideals
• Limiting dictatorial rules
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Coalitions and catastrophic climate change
• A systematic approach to the construction of non-empty choice sets

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