Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists

DOI10.1007/s10058-006-0013-0zbMath1160.91328MaRDI QIDQ882556

Norman Schofield

Publication date: 24 May 2007

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-006-0013-0

zbMATH Keywords

local Nash equilibrium; valence; activists; stochastic electoral model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B70: Stochastic models in economics

91B12: Voting theory

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Gridlock or Leadership in U.S. Electoral Politics, Political equilibria with electoral uncertainty, Competition for popular support: a valence model of elections in Turkey, Estimating the effects of activists in two-party and multi-party systems: comparing the United States and Israel, Can the majority lose the election?, The convergence coefficient across political systems, Application of a theorem in stochastic models of elections, A model of political competition with activists applied to the elections of 1989 and 1995 in Argentina, Modeling the effect of campaign advertising on US presidential elections when differences across states matter, The ``probability of a fit choice

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