A model of party constraints on optimal candidate positions

DOI10.1016/0895-7177(89)90415-9zbMath0672.90005OpenAlexW2050164375MaRDI QIDQ1120436

John H. Aldrich, Michael D. McGinnis

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Mathematical and Computer Modelling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0895-7177(89)90415-9

zbMATH Keywords

political partiesactivistscompaign organizationexistence of distinct Nash equilibria distributions of partyexistence of distinct Nash equilibria distributions of party activistsspatial model of electoral competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Related Items (5)

Equilibria in non-cooperative competition of political parties having a common rate of morality ⋮ Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists ⋮ When parties are not teams: party positions in single-member district and proportional representation systems ⋮ Deliberative democracy and electoral competition ⋮ A model of political competition with activists applied to the elections of 1989 and 1995 in Argentina

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Policy Related Voting and Electoral Equilibrium
• Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
• General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models

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