When parties are not teams: party positions in single-member district and proportional representation systems
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Publication:412076
DOI10.1007/S00199-011-0610-1zbMATH Open1266.91090OpenAlexW2111409929MaRDI QIDQ412076FDOQ412076
William Leblanc, James M. jun. Snyder, Stephen Ansolabehere
Publication date: 3 May 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0610-1
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Cites Work
- Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
- Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems
- Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model
- A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy
- A model of party constraints on optimal candidate positions
- Local Political Equilibria
- Two-party competition with many constituencies
Cited In (5)
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