Political-economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case
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Publication:1374815
DOI10.1007/S003550050082zbMATH Open0888.90009OpenAlexW1972084520MaRDI QIDQ1374815FDOQ1374815
Authors: John E. Roemer
Publication date: 11 December 1997
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050082
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Social choice (91B14) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)
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