A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy
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Publication:412094
DOI10.1007/S00199-011-0625-7zbMATH Open1277.91149OpenAlexW2127702318WikidataQ110167441 ScholiaQ110167441MaRDI QIDQ412094FDOQ412094
Authors: David P. Baron, Daniel Diermeier, Pohan Fong 
Publication date: 3 May 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31174
Recommendations
inefficiencyproportional representationgovernment formationlack of commitmentparliamentary democracypolicy dynamics
Cites Work
- A Structural Model of Government Formation
- Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of bargaining games
- Government turnover in parliamentary democracies
- A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
- Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems
- The dynamics of distributive politics
- Dynamic legislative policy making
- Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard
- Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy
- On participation games with complete information
Cited In (27)
- Two-party competition with persistent policies
- A spatial theory of party formation
- Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy
- Introduction to the symposium in political economy
- The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections
- A Structural Model of Government Formation
- Democratization Under the Threat of Revolution: Evidence From the Great Reform Act of 1832
- Executive control and legislative success
- Tax contracts, party bargaining, and government formation
- On the Faustian dynamics of policy and political power
- The importance of the electoral rule: evidence from Italy
- Ideologies, status quo, and parties' outside options in parliamentary politics
- The part-time parliament
- When parties are not teams: party positions in single-member district and proportional representation systems
- On the spatial representation of preference profiles
- Corruption and power in democracies
- A model of stability and persistence in a democracy
- A theory of political gridlock
- Flexibility vs. protection from an unrepresentative legislative majority
- Ideology and endogenous constitutions
- A coalitional theory of unemployment insurance and employment protection
- Government turnover in parliamentary democracies
- Dynamics of the presidential veto: A computational analysis
- Power sharing and electoral equilibrium
- The dynamics of distributive politics
- Electing a parliament
- Cycles in public opinion and the dynamics of stable party systems
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