Tax contracts, party bargaining, and government formation

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2012.04.004MaRDI QIDQ712479zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hans Gersbach, Maik T. Schneider

Publication date 16 October 2012

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://opus.bath.ac.uk/43364/1/Gersbach_Schneider_MSS12_Tax_contracts_Government_Formation.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

government formationtax contractswelfare of voters

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Welfare economics (91B15)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2216492 (Why is no real title available?)
• A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic
• Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment
• Do voters vote ideologically?
• Electoral Systems and Public Spending
• Tax contracts, party bargaining, and government formation
• The optimal degree of commitment in a negotiation with a deadline

Cited in

(4)

• Tax incidence with bargaining
• Tax contracts, party bargaining, and government formation
• Coalition preclusion contracts and moderate policies
• Reelection threshold contracts in politics

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