Tax contracts, party bargaining, and government formation

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2012.04.004zbMATH Open1250.91044OpenAlexW1965822118MaRDI QIDQ712479FDOQ712479

Authors: Hans Gersbach, Maik T. Schneider 

Publication date: 16 October 2012

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://opus.bath.ac.uk/43364/1/Gersbach_Schneider_MSS12_Tax_contracts_Government_Formation.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

government formationtax contractswelfare of voters

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment
• A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic
• Do voters vote ideologically?
• Electoral Systems and Public Spending
• The optimal degree of commitment in a negotiation with a deadline
• Tax contracts, party bargaining, and government formation

Cited In (4)

• Tax incidence with bargaining
• Tax contracts, party bargaining, and government formation
• Coalition preclusion contracts and moderate policies
• Reelection threshold contracts in politics

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