On the spatial representation of preference profiles

DOI10.1007/S00199-011-0669-8MaRDI QIDQ1941972zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jon X. Eguia

Publication date 25 March 2013

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0669-8

zbMATH Keywords

spatial modelsspatial representationutility representationmultidimensional preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Utility theory (91B16) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3339023 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078637 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• On the existence of expected multi-utility representations
• Political equilibria with electoral uncertainty
• Recognizing one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles
• Regularity of pure strategy equilibrium points in a class of bargaining games
• Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule
• The Fed's monetary policy rule and U.S. Inflation: The case of asymmetric preferences
• The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent Equilibrium
• Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation
• What's so special about Euclidean distance? A characterization with applications to mobility and spatial voting

Cited in

(4)

• Spherical preferences
• Foundations of spatial preferences
• On Aumann and Serrano's economic index of risk
• Visualization of dynamic consumer preference and consumer positioning

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