Foundations of spatial preferences
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In this brief paper the author considers objects having multiple attributes and formulates necessary and sufficient conditions for representing preferences by utility functions of specific forms. For a case with multiple agents, an additional condition on preferences is given to find a representation common to all agents.
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Cites work
- A dynamical model of political equilibrium
- A Representation Theorem for "Preference for Flexibility"
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- Do voters vote ideologically?
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Cited in
(13)- Spatial multi-attribute decision analysis: axiomatic foundations and incomplete preference information
- On the spatial representation of preference profiles
- Weighted majority tournaments and Kemeny ranking with 2-dimensional Euclidean preferences
- Spherical preferences
- Monotonic norms and orthogonal issues in multidimensional voting
- Axioms for Euclidean preferences with a valence dimension
- Geometry on the utility space
- Multidimensional Manhattan preferences
- A multidimensional spatial model for preference representation in multi-criteria group decision aiding
- The Condorcet dimension of metric spaces
- Voter preferences over interval platforms: axioms, canonical reduction, and valence-minus-penalty representation
- Euclidean preferences
- Spatial implementation
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