Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule
From MaRDI portal
Cited in
(44)- Ordinal ranking and preference strength
- Information and preference in partial orders: A bimatrix representation
- The uncovered set in spatial voting games
- Limits on agenda control in spatial voting games
- Stability of decision systems under majority rule
- Continuity properties of majority rule with intermediate preferences
- Transformations of the commodity space, behavioral heterogeneity, and the aggregation problem
- Probability and convergence for supra-majority rule with Euclidean preferences
- A voting model for the allocation of public goods: Existence of an equilibrium
- Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
- Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact
- A dynamical model of political equilibrium
- A general framework for distance-based consensus in ordinal ranking models
- Compaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies
- On the spatial representation of preference profiles
- Dominance in spatial voting with imprecise ideals
- Reaching across the aisle to block reforms
- Weighted majority tournaments and Kemeny ranking with 2-dimensional Euclidean preferences
- Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel
- A note on the finesse point
- On the instability of majority decision-making: testing the implications of the `chaos theorems' in a laboratory experiment
- The instability of instability of centered distributions
- The almost surely shrinking yolk
- A critique of distributional analysis in the spatial model
- The finagle point might not be within the -core
- Multidimensional electoral competition between differentiated candidates
- A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games
- A general equilibrium model of multi-party competition
- Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
- Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model
- Divergent platforms
- Extremal Restriction, Condorcet Sets, and Majority Decision Making
- Electoral competition with uncertainty averse parties
- Foundations of spatial preferences
- Abstention causes bifurcations in two-party voting dynamics.
- Accurate algorithms for identifying the median ranking when dealing with weak and partial rankings under the Kemeny axiomatic approach
- On the dimension of the set of yolk centers
- Pure strategy Nash equilibria for bargaining models of collective choice
- The probability of majority rule instability in the 2D Euclidean model with an even number of voters
- The Condorcet dimension of metric spaces
- Majority rule in multi-dimensional spatial models
- Davis-Hinich conditions and median outcomes in probabilistic voting models
- Limiting distributions for continuous state Markov voting models
- Euclidean preferences
This page was built for publication: Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5677250)
