Dominance in spatial voting with imprecise ideals
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Cites work
- A dynamical model of political equilibrium
- A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule
- Approximate cores of replica games and economies. II: Set-up costs and firm formation in coalition production economies
- Approximation of the yolk by the LP yolk
- Comparison of Weighting Judgments in Multiattribute Utility Measurement
- Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
- Generic Instability of Majority Rule
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3658573 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1266748 (Why is no real title available?)
- Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
- Limiting distributions for continuous state Markov voting models
- Multiple Objective Linear Programming with Interval Criterion Weights
- On the uniqueness of the yolk
- Probability and convergence for supra-majority rule with Euclidean preferences
- Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model
- Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model
- Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule
- Stable outcomes in spatial voting games
- The instability of instability of centered distributions
- The probability of majority rule instability in the 2D Euclidean model with an even number of voters
- The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
- Unifying voting theory from Nakamura's to Greenberg's theorems
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