The probability of majority rule instability in the 2D Euclidean model with an even number of voters

DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0458-5zbMath1232.91187OpenAlexW2131310860MaRDI QIDQ708885

Craig A. Tovey

Publication date: 15 October 2010

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0458-5

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityequilibriummajority rulespatial votingEuclidean preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Related Items (3)

Toward a \(50\%\)-majority equilibrium when voters are symmetrically distributed ⋮ On the uniqueness of the yolk ⋮ Dominance in spatial voting with imprecise ideals

Cites Work

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• The generic existence of a core for \(q\)-rules
• Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model
• Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model
• A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule
• Generic Instability of Majority Rule
• Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point
• Voting Equilibria in Multidimensional Choice Spaces
• General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
• Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule

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